The reading was about a dilemma the problem of evil within our world causes for Christian theology. The argument underlying this dilemma is:
The reading provides three main Christian responses to the problem of evil (theodicies), and examines the pros and cons of each. What follows is a quick response to each of the theodicies presented:
1. Augustinian
I found Augustine’s belief of sin being totally responsible for pain and suffering as unconvincing. I agreed with Schleiermacher’s criticism, that if God’s creation was perfect then it is contradictory to say something went wrong spontaneously with it. I also find compelling the argument from science, which reveals death existed within creation long before humanity.
2. Irenaean
I found this response to be the most promising. I especially liked the reasoning of how God did not intend creation to be initially perfect, but rather as a place of “soul making.” However, I disagree with its universal outlook on salvation as I do not find this to be scripturally consistent. I also have reservations as to the validity of assuming we can perfect ourselves, and all become “children of God.” Why could someone not choose to be against God, and so end up at the opposite end?
3. Modern Process
I found this to be the most distasteful response because of the theological importance to me that God retains the quality of omnipotence. If God is a part of the universe and so not the all-powerful creator of it; while such a God might still be awesome, I would not feel the need to worship such a God as sovereign.
I also tend agree with the criticism that this theodicy is elitist. The view that the minority should suffer for the good of God and the majority, for me generates a feeling of bitterness towards a God who sees “any” good with such a dichotomy. I would much rather concede God does not exist, then to go to such lengths to retain a God belief.
I believe one of the main issues within an argument exposing the problem of evil, lies with ambiguities of what the terms “all-loving” and “all-powerful” encompass (including their often substituted terms).
For example, if God is perfectly loving then He must wish to abolish evil. Yet if God abolishes evil then it stands to reason that God does not love evil, and therefore God is not perfectly loving. So some restrictions need to be attached to the meaning of “all-loving” in order for the argument not to be self-undermining.
Adding into the equation our freedom for evil; according to the given argument God must either a) take away such freedom; or b) abolish us. None of these conclusions seem fit of an all-loving God. Therefore I believe that “perfectly loving” should only apply in accordance to God’s holy character and also what is logically possible.
Someone might note that I just admitted God can’t do something, and so God can’t be all-powerful. I believe sceptics often prey on an ambiguity to push the meaning of omnipotence into something it is not. As respected Christian apologist CS Lewis wrote:
It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but nonentities. It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God.1
To conclude, I do not see an omnipotent and perfectly loving God when properly defined as incompatible within the world we live.
1 C S. Lewis, Selected Books: The Problem of Pain. (Great Britain: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1999), 482.
Lewis, C S. Selected Books: The Problem of Pain. Great Britain, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1999.
© 2004 Scott Brisbane